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FEDERAL RESTRICTIONS OF WAGE GARNISHMENTS:
TITLE III OF THE CONSUMER CREDIT PROTECTION ACT
INTRODUCTION
Congress has recently passed the Consumer Credit Protection Act
(CCPA) 1 which is designed to "safeguard the consumer in connection
with the utilization of credit by requiring full disclosure of the terms and
conditions of finance charges in credit transactions or in offers to extend
credit [and] by restricting the garnishment of wages .. "2 The Act
is the result of seven years of Congressional hearings on the need for
consumer credit protection legislation.' That the total amount of con-
sumer credit, as of September 1967, was estimated to be 95.886 billion
dollars, seventeen times as great as in 1945, and currently American
consumers are paying approximately as much in interest and service
charges as the annual interest on the national debt4 evinces this need.
Concurrently with the growth in consumer credit, the number of
personal bankruptcies has also risen. During the fiscal year ending June
30, 1967, there were 208,000 personal bankruptcies compared with-
18,000 such bankruptcies in 1950.' Title III, a little publicized section
of the CCPA which restricts wage garnishments,6 was designed to
"relieve countless debtors driven by economic desperation from plunging
into bankruptcy in order to preserve their employment and insure a
continued means of support for themselves and their families." 7 The
1. Act of May 22, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 [hereinafter cited as Pub.
L. No. 90-321].
2. Pub. L. No. 90-321, 5 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1232 (1968).
3. H.R RE'. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1967) [hereinafter cited as H.R.
REP. No. 1040].
4. Id. at 10.
5. Id. at 20.
6. Garnishment is a statutory collection device whereby a debtor's assets in the
hands of a third party may be reached by a creditor. Garnishment may be used before
judgment but normally only if the grounds for a valid attachment exist, while garnish-
ment after a judgment adverse to the defendant may proceed without such grounds. It
is normally used by creditors against those debtors whose principal assets are in the
form of unpaid wages in the hands of the debtors' employers. Garnishment is distin-
guishable from the processes of attachment and execution. Attachment is a seizure of a
litigant's property in his possession prior to any adjudication of the dispute, while
execution is a legal remedy for the enforcement of a judgment of the court. In garnish-
ment proceedings the property is left with the garnishee. Title III expressly restricts its
coverage to garnishment of wages: "The term 'garnishment' means any legal or
equitable procedure through which the earnings of any individual are required to be
withheld for payment of any debt" Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 302(c). Garnishment will be
used throughout this comment only in'this limited sense.
7. H.R. REP. No. 1040 at 21. The effects of garnishment are not, however, limited
to voluntary proceedings in bankruptcy for, in a majority of jurisdictions, garnishment
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need for restriction of wage garnishment is underscored by President
Johnson's message on urban and rural poverty delivered in 1967:
Hundreds of workers among the poor lose their jobs or most
of their wages each year as a result of garnishment proceedings.
In many cases, wages are garnished by unscrupulous merchants
and lenders whose practices trap the unwitting workers.8
There are a number of ways in which the effect of excessive garnish-
ments and subsequent discharge upon a debtor-employee could be miti-
gated. Thus all wages could be made exempt from garnishment, or a
debtor-employee discharged after garnishment could be given either
compensatory damages or reinstatement, or both, in an action against
his discharging employer. The express provisions of Title III provide only
a statutory minimum exemption on wage garnishments9 and a criminal
is declared to create a lien on the garnishee's obligation to the debtor-employee from
the time of notice to the garnishee. If this lien is not removed within the statutory
period, it constitutes an act of bankruptcy which is one of the prerequisites to an in-
voluntary bankruptcy proceeding. 11 U.S.C. § 21(a) (3) (1964). See ALA. CODE tit. 7, §
869 (1958); ILL. ANN. STAT. § 62-77 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967); Onio tR~v. CODE
ANN. § 2715.19 (Page 1954) ; TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4084 (1966) ; VA. CODE
ANN. § 8-441 (Supp. 1968); contra, IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-525 (Burns 1968 Repl.).
For a discussion of the relationship between garnishment and bankruptcy proceedings
see note 41 infra.
By increasing the amount of wages exempt from garnishment, Title III can be
interpreted as an expression of a Congressional desire that a debtor-employee have
available alternative relief to voluntary proceedings in bankruptcy.
8. Message from the President of the United States transmitting recommendations
on urban and rural poverty, H.R. Doc. No. 88, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1967). A rather
poignant example of the harsh effects of garnishment appeared in a recent Associated
Press dispatch from the site of a mine explosion which trapped seventy-eight miners.
The wife of one of the trapped miners related the effect of garnishment on her family:
We owe . . . so much (my husband] has got only two paychecks in two
years. The last check he got was for $7.32. All the rest from his work in the
mine [approx. 135 dollars per week] was taken out ahead to pay our debts
.... But it's getting better all the time. We'll be out of garnishing the first
of the year. But now, he only gets about two hours of sleep a day [due to a
second full-time job digging graves and setting headstones].
The Indianapolis Star, Nov. 23, 1968, at 4, col. 1.
It must be admitted, however, that some of the harsh effects of garnishment result
from a debtor's ignorance of the availability of voluntary bankruptcy proceedings, wage
earner's plans or state insolvency proceedings.
9. (a) Except as provided in subsection (b) and in section 305, the maximum
part of the aggregate disposable earnings of an individual for any workweek
which is subjected to garnishment may not exceed (1) 25 per centum of
his disposable earnings for that week, or (2) the amount by which his dis-
posable earnings for that week exceed thirty times the Federal minimum
hourly wage prescribed by section 6(a) (1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938 in effect at the time the earnings are payable, whichever is less. In
the case of earnings for any pay period other than a week, the Secretary of
Labor shall by regulation prescribe a multiple of the Federal minimum hourly
wage equivalent in effect to that set forth in paragraph (2). (b) The
restrictions of subsection (a) do not apply in the case of (1) any order of
any court for the support of any person, (2) any order of any court of
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penalty for an employer who wrongfully discharges an employee by
reason of a garnishment for one indebtedness." These provisions repre-
sent a balance between an employee's need for protection from the
"harsh and burdensome effects" of the "predatory extension of credit"
by creditors relying upon wage garnishment, and a creditor's need for a
collection device of last resort."
Title III raises questions of the scope of Congressional power under
the commerce and bankruptcy clauses, the effect which Title III will have
on existing state laws, and the availability and effectiveness of the
remedies provided in Title III. The need for exploration of these
questions provided the impetus for this comment.
I. CONSTITUTIONALITY
As authority for Title III, Congress invoked its powers under both
the commerce clause"2 and the bankruptcy clause.'" Congressional power
under either clause would be sufficient to sustain the validity of Title III
if the method employed by Congress fell within the restrictions of the
necessary and proper clause. 4 Since many employees who would be
covered are not employed within an industry engaged in interstate com-
merce, and since garnishment is used by creditors before an employee is
covered by the Bankruptcy Act, questions arise as to the validity of the
constitutional authority."
A. THE COMMERCE POWER
W\ithin the scope of the commerce clause," Congress' power to
bankruptcy under chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act, (3) any debt due for
any State or Federal tax.
Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 303(a), (b).
10. "(a) No employer may discharge any employee by reason of the fact that his
earnings have been subjected to garnishment for any one indebtedness. (b) Whoever
willfully violates subsection (a) of thii section shall be fined not more than $1,000, or
imprisoned not more than one year, or both." Id. § 304(a), (b). For a discussion of an
implied private civil remedy for an employee see text accompanying notes 62 to 75 infra.
11. H.R. REP. No. 1040 at 20.
12. "[The Congress shall have Power] . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.. . ." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
13. "[The Congress shall have Power] ... To establish ... uniform Laws on the
subject of Bankruptcy throughout the United States... ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
14. "[The Congress shall have Power] . . . To make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof. . . ." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
15. A detailed analysis of the extent of the commerce and bankruptcy powers under
the Constitution is outside the scope of this comment. Only a brief summary of interpre-
tations relevant to Title III will be attempted.
16. For a discussion of the intended reach of the commerce power, compare W.
CROSSXEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
(1953) (commerce power intended to extend to all commerce within the states) with
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regulate commerce is plenary in nature.'7 In determining the extent of
the commerce power, the relevant focus of constitutional inquiry is upon
effects, not causes.
The source of the restraint [on interstate commerce] may
be intrastate, as the making of a contract . ..usually is; the
application of the restraint may be intrastate, as it often is;
but neither matters if the necessary effect is to stifle or restrain
commerce among the states. If it is interstate commerce that
feels the pinch, it does not matter how local the operation
which applies the squeeze. 8
To cite one pertinent example, in a decision upholding Congressional
power under the commerce clause over home-grown wheat used to feed
the grower's livestock, the Supreme Court held that even if the "activity
be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still,
whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial
economic effect on interstate commerce."' 19
Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention and in Contemporary
Comment, 25 MINx. L. REv. 432 (1941) (commerce power intended to prevent state
barriers to trade and provide for regulation of external commerce). Formerly it was
held that the scope of the commerce power was coextensive with the concept of
interstate commerce. However, it is an economic reality that interstate and intrastate
aspects of commerce, as well as functions within a single commercial enterprise, are
inseparably intertwined and therefore an artificial distinction between interstate and
intrastate commerce is inappropriate to delimit the effective regulation of commerce.
North American Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686, 705 (1946). "When the conduct of an
enterprise affects commerce among the states is a matter of practical judgment, not to be
determined by abstract notions." Polish Nat'l Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643, 650
(1944). See Chief Justice Marshall's rather broad interpretation of the necessary and
proper clause in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819). In the
last thirty years, the federal commerce power has been determined to be coextensive with
the economic needs of the nation and Congress has the power to regulate commerce
among the states by those reasonable means which Congress deems necessary to protect
the national economic interests. For a survey of the leading cases establishing the
present theory of the scope of the commerce clause, see Stern, The Commerce Clause
and the National Economy, 1933-1946, 59 HA.zv. L. Rav. 645, 947 (1946). An explanation
of the present theory appears in Stern, The Scope of the Phrase Interstate Commerce,
41 A.B.A.J. 823, 871 (1955).
17. E.g., Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 422 (1947);
American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90 (1946) ; Cleveland v. United States,
329 U.S. 14 (1946); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946); North
American Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686 (1946); Overnight Motor Transp. Co., Inc. v.
Missel, 316 U.S. 572 (1942); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110
(1942) ; United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) ; Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v.
Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940) ; United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938);
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
18. United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfrs. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949).
"The Sherman Act and the National Labor Relations Act are familiar examples of the
exertion of the commerce power to prohibit or control activities wholly intrastate
because of their effect on interstate commerce." United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100,
122 (1941).
19. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942).
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Congress found wage garnishment to have a two-pronged effect on
interstate commerce."0 The first effect may be analyzed in three steps:
garnishments which are unrestricted, or inadequately restricted2' when
measured by the standard established in Title III, encourage undesirable
extension of credit,2 which diverts money from payment for goods and
services into excessive credit payments, and this diversion hinders the
production and flow of goods in interstate commerce." Whatever the
merits of this theory, it is premised upon the fact that most wage
garnishment actions are brought by local creditors2" and that many
of these local extensions of credit involve excessive interest and service
charges. Consequently, Congress concluded that local eddies are produced
in the nationwide flow of goods, services, and payments and, in addition,
that the composition of this flow is altered by the introduction of payment
for excessive interest and service charges.2" To limit federal regulatory
power over the nation's commerce to the flow of goods and services and
to deny Congress power over the return flow of payments for these goods
and services is to ignore their essential identity and to defeat in large
measure the power to regulate commerce at all.
The second effect of wage garnishment upon interstate commerce
results from wage garnishment's relation to employment discharge which
20. Congress found:
(1) The unrestricted garnishment of compensation due for personal services
encourages the making of predatory extensions of credit. Such extensions of
credit divert money into excessive credit payments and thereby hinder the
production and flow of goods in interstate commerce. (2) The application
of garnishment as a creditors' remedy frequently results in loss of employment
by the debtor, and the resulting disruption of employment, production, and
consumption constitutes a substantial burden on interstate commerce.
Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 301(a) (1), (2).
21. For a comparison of present state limitations on garnishment with the
proposed standard under Title III see note 120 infra.
22. The factual foundation for this conclusion is weak since the amount of credit
extended in reliance upon garnishment as a collection device is subject to doubt. A
recent study has shown that there appears to be little correlation between the extension
of consumer credit and wage garnishment laws. Brunn, Wage Garnishment in California:
A Study and Recommendations, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 1214, 1239-43 (1965). However, a
possible reason for the lack of correlation is the wide variety of collection services and
devices available to the creditor in addition to wage garnishment. Jablonski, Wage
Garnishment as a Collection Device, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 759, 763-64 (1967) ; Riesenfeld,
Collection of Money Judgments in American Law, 42 IowA L. REv. 155, 181 (1957).
23. It should, however, be recognized that payments to local creditors subsequently
provide the basis for additional credit purchases 'by other borrowers of goods and
services in interstate commerce.
24. See Brunn, supra note 22, at 1239.
25. The commerce power extends to ensuring a smooth national flow of commerce
and elimination of undue local obstructions to the flow. E.g., Katzenbach v. McClung,
379 U. S. 294 (1964) (interstate flow of payments for food unduly disturbed by
racial discrimination in restaurant accommodations) ; Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (interstate flow of Negro travelers affected by discrimina-
tion in providing lodging).
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affects both production and consumption of goods by the discharged
debtor-employee. Wage garnishment frequently leads to discharge for
two reasons: processing of garnishments entails unnecessary and unpro-
ductive expense from the employer's viewpoint and the employer is made
aware of the employee's financial insecurity with its possible adverse
effect upon the employee's productivity." Consequently, many employers
have a fixed policy of discharge by reason of garnishment."
When Congress has deemed regulation of activities affecting inter-
state commerce to be necessary, as in Title III, the role of the courts is to
determine whether Congress had a reasonable basis for its judgment, and
not to initiate an inquiry as to proper weight to be given facts considered
by Congress.2" It seems doubtful that a court would find that Congress
has exceeded reasonable limits for the judgment which it has exercised,
or that Title III is violative of any other Constitutional provision."
Therefore, Title III would appear to be a valid exercise of power under
the commerce clause.
B. THE BANKRUPTCY POWER
As an alternative justification for the enactment of Title III,
Congress based its authority upon the bankruptcy clause, under which
26. CCH HANDBOOK ON ASSIGNMENT AND GARNISHMENT OF WAGES 9 (1966).
27. Such rules providing for discharges after multiple garnishments have usually
been held reasonable in labor arbitration proceedings. Id.
28. E.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Polish Nat'l Alliance v.
NLRB, 332 U.S. 643 (1944); Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332 (1917); Adair v. United
States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908). But see Locomotive Firemen v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R.,
89 S. Ct. 323 (1968).
In the absence of Congressional legislation, the Court has engaged in extensive fact-
finding when state economic regulation is attacked as unduly burdening interstate com-
merce. See Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) ; South Carolina State
Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938). Underlying this practice is the
possibility that the national interest may not have been adequately represented in the
state legislative hearings. This consideration is not present in Court review of Con-
gressional decisions regarding the necessity of federal interests prevailing over local
interests and Congress would seem to be the governmental branch properly equipped and
authorized to make this determination.
29. See text accompanying notes 3 to 5 supra.
30. Congress found that "[t]he great disparities among the laws of the several
States relating to garnishment have, in effect, destroyed the uniformity of the bank-
ruptcy laws and frustrated the purposes thereof in many areas of the country." Pub. L.
No. 90-321, § 301 (a) (3). The phraseology "uniform Laws on the subject of Bank-
ruptcy" does not require that Congress must find a non-uniformity in existing laws as
a prerequisite to action under the bankruptcy clause; rather, it only requires that laws
enacted under the bankruptcy clause be uniform.
The uniformity required by the bankruptcy clause is geographical uniformity as the
law is applied to the states and not a uniform combined effect of state and federal laws
as applied to the individual debtor. Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181 (1902) ;
Central States Life Ins. Co. v. Chilton, 77 F.2d 993 (10th Cir. 1935); Bradford v.
Fahey, 76 F.2d 628 (4th Cir. 1935), rev'd on other grounds, 77 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1935) ;
Campbell v. Alleghany Corp., 75 F.2d 947 (4th Cir. 1935) ; Louisville Joint Stock Land
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exercise of legislative power is limited to regulation of those subjects
which are within the subject of bankruptcies. 1 Although the principal
Congressional enactment to date under the bankruptcy power is the
Bankruptcy Act, the subject of bankruptcies is broader than the limits
within which the Act is applicable.32
The problem of defining the subject of bankruptcies is complicated by
the changing nature of this somewhat vague concept as the nation's
commercial, industrial, and social conditions change."3 Neither the extent
of power formerly exercised by Congress, 4 nor the methods heretofore
utilized, 5 can be relied upon to delimit the concept. An examination of
Bank v. Radford, 74 F.2d 576 (6th Cir. 1935), rev'd on other grounds, 295 U.S. 555
(1935) ; In re Sink, 27 F.2d 361 (W.D. Va. 1928); In re Davis, 13 F. Supp. 221
(E.D.N.Y. 1936); In re Pierce-Arrow Sales Corp., 10 F. Supp. 776 (W.D.N.Y. 1935);
In re Cope, 8 F. Supp. 778 (D. Colo. 1934), ree'd on other grounds, 8 F. Supp. 961
(D. Colo. 1935). Therefore, the Congressional attempt under Title III to make uniform
the combined action of state wage exemption laws and federal bankruptcy laws is not
required by the bankruptcy clause and thus alone does not serve as a valid justification
for Title III. The legislative and judicial view of the purpose of bankruptcy laws has
undergone extensive change since the passage of the first bankruptcy law. Although the
original overriding purpose was to protect creditors by an equal distribution of the
debtor's property, the rehabilitation of the debtor has come to be recognized as an
equally important purpose of bankruptcy laws. Simonson v. Grandquist, 369 U.S. 38
(1962); Young v. Higbee, 324 U.S. 204 (1945); Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color
Corp., 313 U.S. 215 (1941); Kuehner v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U.S. 445 (1937);
Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935) ; Straton v. New,
283 U.S. 318 (1931); Meek v. Centre County Banking Co., 268 U.S. 426 (1925);
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Bray, 225 U.S. 205 (1912) ; Bailey v. Glover, 88
U.S. (21 Wall.) 342 (1874); MacDonald v. Tefft-Weller Co., 128 F. 381 (5th Cir.
1904) ; United States v. Pusey, 27 F. Cas. 631 (No. 16,098) (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1872).
31. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. For the text of the bankruptcy clause see note
13 supra.
32. For examples of federal bankruptcy legislation not contained in the Bankruptcy
Act, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 151-55 (1964) (concealment of assets, embezzlement by trustee,
conduct of referees, and fee agreements in bankruptcy proceedings) ; 18 U.S.C. § 3057
(1964) (bankruptcy investigations).
33. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, RI. & Pac. Ry., 294
U.S. 648 (1935). See Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502 (1937).
34. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 30 Stat. 546 (1898), did not provide for all
matters within the "subject of bankruptcies"; e.g., there was no adequate provision for
extension of time to insolvent debtors or for corporate reorganization. The Act was
designed primarily for the relief of those whose debts had been incurred in mercantile
and manufacturing pursuits and their creditors. Subsequent amendments to the Bank-
ruptcy Act have enlarged the exercise of power to areas beyond the original Act.
Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433 (1940) ; Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford,
295 U.S. 555 (1935) ; Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac.
Ry., 294 U.S. 648 (1935); Campbell v. Alleghany Corp., 75 F.2d 947 (4th Cir.
1935) ; In re Landquist, 70 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1934) ; Engstrom v. DeVos, 81 F. Supp.
854 (E.D. Wash. 1949). There is no reason to believe that the present extent of
regulation under the Act represents an exercise of all the power granted Congress
under the bankruptcy clause.
35. "Congress may prescribe any regulations concerning . . . bankruptcy that are
not so grossly unreasonable as to be incompatible with fundamental law. . . ." Hanover
Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 192 (1902). See Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 122 (1819) ; In re Landquist, 70 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1934).
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the rather limited body of case law does, however, provide helpful insight
into the definitional problem.
Bankruptcy in the statutory sense arises as one possible result of a
debtor-creditor relationship, and it seems clear that the subject of bank-
ruptcies does not extend beyond the bounds of this relationship."8
Within the debtor-creditor relationship, it extends to providing relief to
insolvent, nonpaying, or fraudulent debtors" or their creditors by dis-
tribution of the debtors' property among their creditors or by discharge
of the debtors from their debts. 8 Within these limits, ". . . all the inter-
mediate legislation, affecting substance and form, . . . [and] .. .tending
to further ...distribution and discharge ...are in the competency and
discretion of Congress.""
Garnishment, used by a creditor as a collection device against a
nonpaying debtor, is therefore within the relationship regulated by the
subject of bankruptcies. However, to be a proper subject for regulation, it
must affect the relief provided debtors and creditors; i.e., distribution of
the debtors' property among creditors. Since a debtor can be discharged
from his debts only under the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, any
other law which affects the necessity of resorting to the Act also affects
the extent to which the discharge process is utilized. The Constitutional
grant of power to Congress to provide for discharge under the bank-
ruptcy clause, considered in conjunction with the necessary and proper
clause,4" includes the power to regulate the availability and extent of use
of discharge by insolvent, nonpaying, or fraudulent debtors.
Although a number of statistical studies have been made of the rela-
tion between state garnishment exemption laws and personal bankruptcies,
the authors differ concerning the significance of wage garnishments as a
36. "The subject of bankruptcies is nothing less than 'the subject of the relations
between an insolvent or nonpaying or fraudulent debtor and his creditors, extending to
his and their relief.'" Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502, 513-14 (1937)
(quoting from In re Reiman, 20 F. Cas. 490 (No. 11,673) (S.D.N.Y. 1874)). Accord,
Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181 (1902) ; Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819); Campbell v. Alleghany Corp., 75 F.2d 947 (4th Cir.
1935); In re Central Funding Corp., 75 F.2d 256 (2d Cir. 1935); III re Utilities
Power & Light Corp., 29 F. Supp. 763 (N.D. Ill. 1939) ; In re Merced Irr. Dist., 25 F.
Supp. 981 (S.D. Cal. 1939) ; lt re Jones, 10 F. Supp. 165 (W.D. Mo. 1935).
37. Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502 (1937) ; Hanover Nat'l
Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181 (1902); Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
122 (1819) ; Campbell v. Alleghany Corp., 75 F.2d 947 (4th Cir. 1935) ; In re Merced
Irr. Dist., 25 F. Supp. 981 (S.D. Cal. 1939).
38. Cases cited note 36 supra.
39. In re Klein, reported in a note to Nelson v. Carland, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 265
(1843) (emphasis added), cited with approval in Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186
U.S. 181 (1902) ; It re Central Funding Corp., 75 F.2d 256 (2d Cir. 1935).
40. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. For the text of the necessary and proper clause
see note 14 supra.
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cause of personal bankruptcy.4' The legislative history of Title III
indicates that the Banking and Currency Committee, relying upon
similar studies of their own, concluded that there was a clear "causal
connection between harsh garnishment laws and high levels of personal
bankruptcies." '42 The Committee found that the garnishment of wages
affected both commerce and bankruptcy by disrupting employment, pro-
duction, and consumption 3 as well as by forcing debtors to plunge into
bankruptcy out of economic desperation.44 Finally, the necessity for
41. On the basis of a finding that the personal bankruptcy rate per capita in three
states without automatic exemptions was approximately nineteen times as great in 1960
as the rate in three states with laws exempting all wages from garnishment, an
experienced referee in bankruptcy concluded that ". . . the one and only primary cause
[of consumer bankruptcy] is the garnishment or threat of garnishment of wages coupled
with an inadequate wage exemption law." Snedecor, Consumer Credit and Bankruptcy,
35 REP. J. 37, 38 (1961); see Driver, Proposal-To Amend the Bankruptcy Act To
Require That Consideration Be Given To The Use of Chapter XIII, 18 PERSONAL
FIN. L.Q. 41 (1963); H.R. REP. No. 1040, supra note 3; D. CowANs, BANKRUPTCY
LAW AND PRACTICE § 622 (1963). Contra, . DoLpINil AN ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC
AND PERSONAL FACTORS LEADING TO CO NSUMtER BANKRUPTCY 40 (1965); Rombauer,
Debt'rs' Exemption Statutes-Revision Ideas, 36 WAsHi. L. REv. 484, 487 (1961);
Sturges & Cooper, Credit Administration and Wage Earner Bankruptcies, 42 YALE L.J.
487, 503-10 (1933). The inherent limitations in this type of analysis are obvious; e.g.,
the other possible causes of personal bankruptcy are not excluded, the number of
garnishment proceedings may not vary directly with the exemption laws, and it is
impossible to determine how many personal bankruptcies would have occurred even
without garnishment.
The Dolphin study referred to above analyzed the consumer bankruptcy petitions
filed in Genesee County, Michigan, in 1963. Although only ten per cent of the 482
petitioners had been garnisheed within the preceding four months, eighty per cent were
threatened with garnishment, and seventy-five per cent indicated that actual or threaten-
ed garnishment was the reason for their filing for bankruptcy. After studying alternatives
to bankruptcy as a means of protection from garnishment available to Michigan
debtors, the author concluded that garnishment need not be a necessary cause of consumer
bankruptcy, and the relation of garnishment to bankruptcy must be viewed in the context
of the varying legal alternatives available to the individual debtor. Notwithstanding the
theory that garnishment is not a necessary causal element in bankruptcy, the study
clearly indicates it is often a cause. The author concluded that either the debtor had
insufficient knowledge of, or was unwilling to utilize, the alternative procedures. In
either event, the fact remains that garnishment was the conscious reason that seventy-
five per cent of the debtors filed for bankruptcy. Furthermore, the failure to utilize
legal alternative means to bankruptcy would seem to permit generalization of the
relation of garnishment to bankruptcy regardless of local variations in these legal
alternatives.
42. "In States such as Pennsylvania and Texas, which prohibit the garnishment of
wages, the number of nonbusiness bankruptcies per 100,000 population are nine and five
respectively, while in those States having relatively harsh garnishment laws, the incidents
of personal bankruptcies range between 200 to 300 per 100,000 population." H.R.
REP. No. 1040, supra note 3, at 20.
43. Id.
44. Id. Wage garnishment is normally employed only when the debtor has no
other attachable assets. It has been estimated that the average wage earner needs
approximately eighty-five per cent of his salary just to meet his ordinary living
expenses. BUREAU or LABOR STATISTICS REP. No. 237-93, CONSUMER EXPENDITURES
AND INCOME 1 (1965). See Jablonski, supra note 22, at 771; Brunn, supra note 22, at
1235-38. Thus, when a debtor is deprived of more than a certain percentage of his
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enactment of Title III will probably not be questioned by the courts
since conclusions made by Congress on the basis of factual investiga-
tions are presumed to be correct. 5
Consequently, Title III would appear to be a valid exercise of power
under the bankruptcy clause since wage garnishment exemption laws lie
within the relationship between an insolvent, nonpaying, or fraudulent
debtor and his creditors, affect distribution of the debtor's property
among his creditors both within and without the Bankruptcy Act, and
affect the use of the discharge process provided by the Act.
II. ENFORCEMENT OF TITLE III
The absence of procedural provisions in Title III indicates that
Congress did not intend to alter existing state garnishment procedures
other than the exemption statutes. Procedurally, state garnishment
statutes differ greatly,46 but normally the garnishee-employer has a duty
to assert the debtor-employee's right to a statutory exemption, including,
presumably, the exemption contained in Title III. 7 If the garnishee-
employer fails to do so, he is not discharged from his liability to the
debtor-employee.4" In the absence of a statutory provision dealing with
wages he is no longer capable of supporting his family and his eventual insolvency
seems inevitable.
45. See cases and discussion at note 28 supra.
46. As an example of the wide variance as seen from the viewpoint of the gar-
nishee, see CCH HANDBOOK ON ASSIGNMENT AND GARNISHMENT OF WAGES (1966).
47. The fact that the exemption invoked as a defense in a state garnishment action
is contained in a federal statute rather than a state statute should have little effect on
procedural rules. In actions in the past under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),
state procedural rules generally govern at both the trial and appellate levels. E.g.,
Rockwood v. Crown Laundry Co., 352 Mo. 561, 178 S.W.2d 440 (1944); Archer v.
Musick, 147 Neb. 1018, 25 N.W.2d 908 (1947) ; Ille v. Travis Oil Corp., 196 Okla. 332,
164 P.2d 998 (1946) ; Hunt v. National Linen Serv. Corp., 178 Tenn. 262, 157 S.W.2d
608 (1941). There is no indication that Congress intended to alter this practice in
actions involving Title III.
The garnishee's duty to assert available exemptions is sometimes limited to those
exemptions known to the garnishee. However, the lack of knowledge referred to is not
lack of knowledge of the existence of a statutory exemption, but rather of a factual
situation relevant to the particular action; e.g., In re Beals, 116 F. 530 (D. Ind. 1902)
(debtor-employee had filed for bankruptcy) ; Badler v. Gillarde Sons Co., 387 Pa. 266,
127 A.2d 680 (1956) (principal-debtor not true owner of property); Steward v.
Northern Assur. Co., 45 W. Va. 734, 32 S.E. 218 (1898) (contract by married woman
void). To allow a garnishee-employer to avoid liability in an action brought by a
debtor-employee on the grounds of lack of knowledge of the statute would render the
duty to assert any statutory exemptions nugatory. In addition, to allow a garnishee-
employer to successfully assert his lack of knowledge of section 303 (a) would serve to
elide the protection afforded the debtor-employee, at least for the first such action
against any single garnishee-employer.
48. E.g., Southern Ry. v. Fulford, 125 Ga. 103, 54 S.E. 68 (1906) ; Elbert Sales Co.
v. Granite City Bank, 55 Ga. App. 835, 192 S.E. 66 (1937) ; Guditus v. Hart, Schaffner
& Marx, 284 Il. App. 166, 1 N.E.2d 699 (1936); Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Sharitt, 43
Kan. 375, 23 Pac. 430 (1889) ; Crisp v. Fort Wayne & E. Ry., 98 Mich. 648, 57 N.V.
1050 (1894) ; Seventy-First Street & Broadway Corp. v. Thorne, 10 N.J. Misc. 99, 157
FEDERAL GARNISHMENT RESTRICTIONS
waiver, most states hold that the debtor-employee waives an exemption
if he fails to assert it before payment by the garnishee.49 Title III must
be analyzed within this procedural context.
A. THE GARNISHEE-EMPLOYER AND TITLE III
In addition to an employer's liability to an employee under state law
if he pays the garnishing creditor an amount in excess of the limitation
contained in Title III" the employer is also subject to both criminal and
civil liability for infraction of Title III's prohibition against wrongful
discharge. The employer's civil liability to the employee will be considered
in connection with the impact of Title III on the employee.5 This section
will be devoted to a consideration of the employer's possible criminal
liability under Title III.
Section 304(a) of Title III provides that "[n]o employer may
discharge any employee by reason of the fact that his earnings have
been subjected to garnishment for any one indebtedness." Although the
subjective motive of an employer in discharging an employee whose
wages have been garnisheed presents a difficult factual issue, much the
same problem has been handled extensively in other contexts. For
example, the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA)52 provides
that an employer may not discharge an employee by reason of the
employee's union membership or activities. 3 Similarly, the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA)" 4 prohibits discharge of an employee because of
his actions in connection with the Act."5 In addition, several states have
enacted statutes prohibiting discharge by reason of garnishment proceed-
A. 851 (1932). However, the garnishee is not liable to the debtor-employee where the
debtor-employee has been personally served; e.g., Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Whipsker, 77
Tex. 14, 13 S.W. 639 (1890) ; or where the debtor-employee has personally appeared in
the garnishment proceedings; e.g., id., or where the garnishee has notified the debtor-
employee of the proceedings; e.g., Pierce v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry., 36 Wis. 283
(1874). A minority of states treat the debtor-employee's exemptions as personal in
nature and do not require the garnishee to assert them; e.g., Pennsylvania R.1. v. Bell,
22 Ohio App. 67, 153 N.E. 293 (1925).
49. E.g., Union Pac. Ry. v. Smersh, 22 Neb. 751, 36 N.W. 139 (1888) ; Hanson v.
Hodge, 92 Wash. 425, 159 Pac. 388 (1916). There seems to be no valid reason why
estoppel of a debtor's assertion of an exemption after payment by the garnishee should
be dependent upon whether the exemption is contained in a federal or a state statute.
50. Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 303 (a). The garnishment limitation chosen by Congress
is the lesser of (1) twenty-five per cent of the wage remaining after all deductions
required by law or (2) the excess over thirty times the Federal minimum hourly wage
(forty-eight dollars at the time of this writing (30 x $1.60)). 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (1)
(Supp. 11 1966). Note that a weekly disposable income less than sixty-four dollars is.
necessary for the latter limitation to apply.
51. See text accompanying notes 62 to 81 infra.
52. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1964).
53. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1964).
54. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1964).
55. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a) (3) (1964).
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ings against an employee."
The factual determination of an employer's motive for discharge
must of necessity rest on inference. However, the courts have been quick
to supply rules of inference which mitigate the difficulty of proof.57
An improper motive on the part of the employer may be established by
inferences arising from circumstances surrounding the discharge, such as
timing of the discharge, other discharges by the employer for garnish-
ment, and absence of past discharges for the justifications asserted by
the employer." Once a prima facie case of violation has been established,
the employer bears the risk of non-persuasion if he fails to introduce
affirmative evidence as to his legal motive for the discharge.5"
Title III's provision against wrongful discharge should not present
any evidentiary problems not already encountered under the FLSA or
the LMRA.6" However, enforcement problems may arise because of the
difference between discharges for matters affecting the entire group of
employees, such as union activities and wage or hour requirements, and
discharges affecting a single debtor-employee garnisheed for a single
indebtedness. For example, the lack of employee familiarity with the
provisions of Title III,1 coupled with the investigative work load
currently carried by the Wage and Hour Division, may result in
numerous undiscovered violations.
B. THE DEBTOR-EMPLOYEE AND TITLE III
Although Title III does not expressly provide a debtor-employee
56. NEW YORK CIVIL PRAC. § 5252 (McKinney Supp. 1968); MICH. ComP. LAWS§ 712A.18b (1968).
57. For example, under section 158 of the LMRA, it is generally recognized that
the burden of proof of the employer's improper motive rests upon the NLRB. E.g.,
Portable Elec. Tools, Inc. v. NLRB, 309 F.2d 423 (7th Cir. 1962) ; NLRB v. Tepper,
297 F.2d 280 (10th Cir. 1961) ; NLRB v. Rickel Bros., Inc., 290 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1961) ;
Ore-Ida Potato Prod., Inc. v. NLRB, 284 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1960); Miller Elec. Mfg.
Co. v. NLRB, 265 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1959). However, specific evidence of the employer's
subjective intent is not an indispensable element of proof of violation of the Act.
NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
58. Teamsters Local 357 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961). The fact that the dis-
charge was subsequent to a garnishment should not alone suffice to raise a presumption
of improper motive. See generally Bituminous Material & Supply Co. v. NLRB, 281
F.2d 365 (8th Cir. 1960) ; NLRB v. National Paper Co., 216 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1954).
59. See NLRB v. Jackson Tile Mfg. Co., 282 F.2d 90 (5th Cir. 1960).
60. The NLRB has shown an ability to determine when garnishment was in fact
the cause of a discharge claimed to be in violation of section 158 (see text accompanying
note 53 supra). E.g, Luisi Truck Lines, 160 NLRB 530 (1966); Capital Distrib. Co.,
147 NLRB 1138 (1964). Nor has the NLRB failed to identify instances when the
garnishment was used only as a pretext. E.g., Mook Weiss Meat Packing Co., 160
NLRB 546 (1966).
61. Labor unions may aid in promoting the effectiveness of Title III by informing
members of the provisions against discharge and the steps necessary to secure the relief
provided by Title III.
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with a private civil remedy for damages resulting from wrongful dis-
charge, it does establish a statutory duty on the part of the garnishee-
employer not to discharge the debtor-employee by reason of garnishment
for any one indebtedness. 2 A breach of a federal statutory duty has long
been held to give rise to an implied right of action on behalf of the
injured persons for whose benefit the statute was enacted.63 Since Title:
III was designed to protect consumers by restricting the garnishment of
wages6" and by providing a criminal sanction for wrongful discharge,65
it would be appropriate for state or federal courts to imply a private civil'
remedy to protect the consumer's interest in his continued employment.6
The recognition of such an implied remedy has been held proper to
further Congressional purpose embodied in other federal statutesr and
62. Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 304(a). For the text of this statute see note 10 supra.
63. ". . . where federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule
from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the
necessary relief." Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946). See Texas & Pac. Ry. v.
Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916); Lowndes, Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legislation,
16 MINN. L. REv. 361 (1932); Morris, The Relation of Criminal Statutes to Tort
Liability, 46 HARv. L. REv. 361 (1932). However, this remedy is limited to redress of
the interests which the statute was intended to protect; e.g., Greater Iowa Corp.. v.,
McLendon, 378 F.2d 783 (8th Cir. 1967) ; Taussig v. Wellington Fund, Inc., 313 F.2d
472 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 806 (1963). See also W. PROSSER, THE
LAW or ToRrs § 35 (2d ed. 1964) ; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965).
64. Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 303. For the text of this statute see note 9 supra.
65. Id., § 304. For the text of this statute see note 10 supra.
66. It is clear that the existence of a private civil remedy implied on the basis of
a statutory duty contained in a federal statute is a federal question. Sola Elec. Co. v.
Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942). It is not clear, however, that such an implied
remedy would fall within the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1964) under which
district courts are given original jurisdiction over acts of Congress regulating commerce,
independent of any minimum jurisdictional amount such as the 10,000 dollar requirement
of federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1964) and diversityjurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1964). This question is crucial to the avail-
ability of federal court jurisdiction over an employee's implied right of action since only
infrequently would the amount involved exceed the 10,000 dollar jurisdictional amount
required by section 1331 (a) or section 1332(a).
Since one of the stated purposes of Title III is to regulate commerce, supra note
20, and since the FLSA, through which Title III is to be enforced, is a regulation of
commerce within the meaning of section 1337 [e.g., Williams v. Jacksonville Terminal,
315 U.S. 386 (1942) (used as alternate ground for jurisdiction); Opp Cotton Mills,
Inc. v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 657 (1941) (jurisdiction exercised and not
challenged); Imm v. Union R.R, 289 F.2d 858 (3d Cir. 1961) ; Manosky v. Bethlehem-
Hingham Shipyard, Inc., 177 F.2d 529 (1st Cir. 1949) ; Fisch v. General Motors Corp.,
169 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1948) ; Johnson v. Butler Bros., 162 F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1947) ;
Robertson v. Argus Hosiery Mills, Inc., 121 F.2d 285 (6th Cir. 1941)], civil actions
under Title III are presumably within the language of section 1337. Since an
employee's implied civil remedy has no existence apart from the statute which created
it, it too is a civil action under Title III and therefore arguably falls under section
1337. However, in the event that a contrary interpretation of section 1337 is indulged
in, the debtor-employee is still free to pursue his action in the state courts.
67. E.g., J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (violation of 15 U.S.C. §
78n(a) (1964)) ; Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282 (1940) (violation
of 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1964)) ; Dann v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 288 F.2d 201 (6th
Cir.1961) (violation of 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1964)) ; Fitzgerald v. Pan American World
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lack of similar flexibility in administering Title III would leave the
discharged debtor-employee's relief dependent upon enforcement by the
Secretary of Labor. s
Neither the existence of alternative remedies under the same federal
statute69 or state law, ° nor the fact that enforcement of the federal statute
is expressly vested in an administrative agency"' will overcome the
implication. There is, however, some authority holding that an employee
does not have an independent remedy under the provisions of the
FLSA.7" This is the result of a provision which provides that "the
Secretary of Labor shall bring all actions ... to restrain violations of this
Act."7 Since Title III is to be enforced by the Secretary through the
provisions of the FLSA,"4 it could be argued that this declaration would
also prohibit an independent action by an employee under Title III. This
argument, however, does not recognize that although Title III grants the
Secretary the powers contained in the FLSA it is an independent statute.
Airways, Inc., 229 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1956) (violation of the Civil Aeronautics Act of
1938, 52 Stat. 993 (1938)). One of the most extensive recent uses of an implied private
civil remedy for violation of a federal statutory duty has been in the area of manipulative
and deceptive devices in the sale of securities. E.g., Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378
F.2d 783 (8th Cir. 1967) ; Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., Inc., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967) ;
Opper v. Hancock Sec. Corp., 367 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1966) ; Colonial Realty Corp. v.
Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966) ; Janigan v.
Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965) ; Crist v. United
Underwriters, Ltd., 343 F.2d 902 (10th Cir. 1965) ; Ruckle v. Rota America Corp., 339
F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964) ; Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); Matheson v.
Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 870 (1961) ; Hooper v.
Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814
(1961) ; Smith v. Bear, 237 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1956) ; Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627
(9th Cir. 1953) ; Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
68. It is clear from the provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 211 (a) (1964) (see text
accompanying note 73 infra) that action by the Secretary on petitions by discharged
employees under the FLSA is discretionary in nature; e.g., Powell v. Washington Post
Co., 267 F.2d 651 (D.C. Cir. 1959). This lack of assurance of relief provides further
impetus to allowing the employee a private civil remedy.
69. Dann v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 288 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1961); Matheson
v. Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 870 (1961) (alternate
civil remedies available under 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771 (1964)).
70. Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., Inc., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967).
71. Dann v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 288 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1961) (action
under 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1964)).
72. Powell v. Washington Post Co., 267 F.2d 651 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
360 U.S. 930 (1959); Bonner v. Elizabeth Arden, Inc., 177 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1949);
Britten v. Grace Linen, Inc., 214 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); but see Deckert v.
Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282 (1940) (action under 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a)
(1964) holding that the power to enforce implies the power to grant effective remedies).
73. 29 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1964) (emphasis added).
74. Pub. L. No. 90-321, section 306, provides that "[tjhe Secretary of Labor, acting
through the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor, shall enforce the pro-
visions of this title." This provision undoubtedly allows the Secretary of Labor use of the
administrative facilities of the Wage and Hour Division, and, if enforcement is not to be
nugatory, the Secretary must also have the powers granted him by the FLSA, which
regulates the activities of the Wage and Hour Division.
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In addition, this position would defeat the legislative purpose of Title
III for it is not reasonable to assume that the Secretary can discover and
prosecute all violations."
When the Secretary of Labor institutes injunctive proceedings to
restrain violations of the FLSA,6 he may incidentally request reim-
bursement or reinstatement for an employee wrongfully discharged in
violation of the FLSA" The district court has jurisdiction to order the
employer to reimburse and reinstate the employee'8 notwithstanding the
failure of Congress to expressly provide for such a remedy in the FLSA.
The district court's jurisdiction is supported by an implication that since
Congress entrusted the enforcement of prohibitions contained in a regula-
tory act to a court of equity, Congress is assumed to have acted with
knowledge of the traditional power of the equity court to provide com-
plete relief in accordance with the statute's purpose."'
Such a jurisdiction is an equitable one. Unless otherwise pro-
vided by statute, all the inherent equitable powers of the
District Court are available for the proper and complete exercise
of that jurisdiction. . . . Moreover, the comprehensiveness of
this equitable jurisdiction is not to be denied or limited in the
absence of a clear and valid legislative command. Unless a
75. Numerous factors would contribute to the likelihood of incomplete enforcement
by the Secretary of Labor. By far the most significant, however, is the fact that the
violation will involve a single employee. To require the Secretary to bring all suits on
behalf of individual employees would unduly burden an already overburdened agency for
in addition to bringing the suit the Wage and Hour Division would have to determine
the merits of the claim.
76. Under the FLSA, the Secretary may bring either an action in federal court for
injunctive relief to restrain violations (29 U.S.C. § 217 (1964)) or an action in any
court of competent jurisdiction, state or federal, to recover unpaid wages upon' a
written request filed by an employee (29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (1964)). For a discussion of
the Secretary of Labor's power to enjoin violations of Title III see note 74 supra.
77. 29 U.S.C. § 215 (a) (1964) provides:
... it shall be unlawful for any person-...
(3) to discharge . . . any employee because such employee has filed any
complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or
related to this chapter....
78. Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960) ; Goldberg v.
Bama Mfg. Corp., 302 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1962) ; Mitchell v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 278 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1960) ; Walling v. O'Grady, 146 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1944);
Mitchell v. Dyess, 180 F. Supp. 852 (S.D. Ala. 1960).
79. Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewlry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960). Accord,
Wirtz v. Jones, 340 F.2d 905 (5th Cir. 1965) (action under FLSA) ; Reich v. Webb,
336 F.2d 153 (9th Cir. 1964) (action by Federal Home Loan Bank Board); SEC v.
Keller Corp., 323 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1963); Alabama v. United States, 304 F.2d 583
(5th Cir. 1962) (action under Civil Rights Act of 1957) ; Los Angeles Trust Deed &
Mortgage Exch. v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1961); Wirtz v. Hotel Employees
Local 6, 265 F. Supp. 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (action under Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act) ; SEC v. Wong, 252 F. Supp. 608 (D.P.R. 1966) ; Wirtz v. Alapaha
Yellow Pine Prod., 217 F. Supp. 465 (M.D. Ga. 1963) (action under FLSA) ; SEC v.
H.S. Simmons & Co., Inc., 190 F. Supp. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
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statute in so many words, or by a necessary and inescapable
inference, restricts the court's jurisdiction in equity, the full
scope of that jurisdiction is to be recognized and applied.8"
Similarly, Title III's provisions prohibiting discharge by reason of
garnishment coupled with the delegation of enforcement to the Secretary
of Labor under the FLSA, give rise to an inference that a district court
may grant compensatory relief to an employee incidental to an injunctive
action by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to Title III. A contrary
interpretation is unreasonable, for to interpret the provisions for in-
junctive relief and for fines so as to deny an action brought on the
employee's behalf for compensatory damages for wrongful discharge
Iwould be inconsistent with the purposes of Title III"' as well as the
traditional powers of an equity court.
C. FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS AND TITLE III
Undoubtedly the most puzzling provision of Title III is that of
section 303 (c) which provides: "[n]o court of the United States or any
State may make, execute, or enforce any order or process in violation
of this section [the restriction on garnishments]."2 The method by which
this section can be enforced is somewhat obscure although Congress
could have intended this provision to be only admonitory. Considering,
arguendo, a refusal by a state court to recognize the garnishment
limitation contained in Title III, it is conceivable, absent the availability
of injunctive relief by a federal court, that a garnishee-employer might
have no recourse except appellate review. 3 Federal courts have tradi-
tionally avoided exerting jurisdiction over state court proceedings
wherever possible in an effort to minimize friction between the state and
the federal judicial systems. A well-developed doctrine of equitable
80. Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 397-98 (1946) (action brought by
the Price Administrator under the Emergency Price Control Act to enjoin the collection
of excessive rents and to require the landlord to reimburse its tenants for monies paid
as a result of past violations, quoted with approval and applied to reimbursement of
lost wages for wrongful discharge under the FLSA in Mitchell v. Robert De Mario
Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 291 (1960)). Accord, Mitchell v. All-States Business
Prod. Corp., 232 F. Supp. 626 (E.D.N.Y. 1964) ; Mitchell v. Stewart Bros. Constr. Co.,
184 F. Supp. 886 (D. Neb. 1960).
81. See Walling v. O'Grady, 146 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1944).
82. Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 303(c).
83. The garnishee-employer as a stakeholder is subject to possible conflicting
claims by the creditor and the employee as to the difference between the state and
federal exemption. Statutory interpleader would be available to the garnishee-employer
only if this difference exceeded the minimum jurisdictional amount of 500 dollars as
required by 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a) (1964).
As a practical matter, this jurisdictional amount is seldom involved in garnishment
proceedings. A fortiori, the 10,000 dollar jurisdictional amount required for rule inter-
pleader renders this procedure generally unavailable in a garnishment proceeding.
FED. R. Civ. P. 22(1).
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abstention based upon the comity principle 4 has been applied extensively
to further this independence between the two systems.
In addition to the doctrine of equitable abstention, federal injunctive
power over state court proceedings has been severely limited by a series
of anti-injunction statutes dating back to 1793.5 The current restrictions
on federal injunctive power are set forth in section 2283 of the judicial
Code which provides:
A court of the United States may not grant an injunction
to stay proceedings in a state court except as expressly
authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of
its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.8
The Congressional intent in enacting the first anti-injunction statute
is unclear" and this uncertainty has given rise to two divergent theories
as to the nature of section 2283. It has been viewed as either a definition
of strict jurisdictional boundaries of the federal court system, 8 or an
expression of judicial guidelines for the application of federal equity
powers in conformance with the comity principle." The importance of
84. E.g., Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern R.R., 341 U.S. 341 (1951);
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). See generally Mr. Justice Harlan's
concurring opinion in Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967); Kurland, Toward a
Cooperative Judicial Federalism: The Federal Court Abstention Doctrine, 24 F.R.D.
481 (1960) ; Wright, The Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered, 37 TEX L. REv. 815
(1959); Comment, Federal Injunctions Against State Actions, 35 GEo. WAsir. L. REv.
744, 800-06 (1967).
The comity principle extends even to the exceptions of the anti-injunction statute
discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 86 et seq. For example, after a discharge
in bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court has the power to enjoin state court proceedings by
a creditor seeking to collect a discharged debt to protect and effectuate its judgments
only in "unusual circumstances." Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934).
Subsequent decisions have, however, interpreted the "unusual circumstances" require-
ment very liberally. See Poolman v. Poolman, 289 F.2d 332 (8th Cir. 1961).
85. Federal Judiciary Act § 5, 1 Stat. 334 (1793).
86. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964). For the historical development leading to the
passage of section 2283, see Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Toucey v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 116, 130-32 (1941). See also Taylor & Willis, The Power of
Federal Courts to Enjoin Proceedings in State Courts, 42 Y.ALE L.J. 1169 (1933)
Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43 HARv. L. R-v. 345 (1930).
87. Comment, Federal Injunctions Against State Actions, 35 GEo. WAsH. L. REv.
744, 76? (1967) ; Note, Anti-Suit Ii-unctions Between State and Federal Courts, 32
U. Cui. L. Rrv. 471 (1965).
88. "This is not a statute conveying a broad general policy for appropriate ad hoe
application. Legislative policy is here expressed in a clear-cut prohibition qualified only
by specifically defined exceptions." Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros.
Co., 348 U.S. 511, 515-16 (1955).
89. E.g., Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220 (1957). The Supreme
Court held that an implied exception to the express language of section 2283 would be
found to exist in circumstances where the application of the comity principle was
inappropriate. For a discussion of Leiter see text accompanying notes 100 to 106 infra.
See also Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965) ; Brewer, Dombrowski v. Pfister:
Federal Injunctions Against State Prosecutions in Civil Rights Cases-A New Trend
in Federal-State Judicial Relations, 34 FoRDHAm L. REv. 71 (1965).
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the distinction between the two theories lies in the latitude which the
latter theory allows for the creation of judicial exceptions to the express
language of section 2283. However, regardless of the theory followed,
unless a state court proceeding falls within one of the exceptions to
section 2283 (an express exception under the former theory, an express
or judicial exception under the latter theory), injunctive relief by a
federal court would be unavailable to stay the state court proceeding.
Authorized by Congress Exception
A general grant of injunctive power to federal courts does not fall
under the act-of-Congress exception of section 2283, absent an indication
that Congress clearly contemplated availability of injunctive relief against
state court proceedings.9" Moreover, although Title III does provide
that the Secretary of Labor shall enforce its provisions, 9' no specific
grant of injunctive power against state court proceedings is included in
Title III, nor does the Secretary have such power under the FLSA,
through which he is to enforce Title III.92 Consequently, federal injunc-
tive relief against state court proceedings must fall within another
exception to section 2283 if such relief is to be available under Title III.
In Aid of Jurisdiction Exception
Section 2283 reserved the traditional power of the federal courts to
protect their prior jurisdiction over a cause of action against a subsequent
state court proceeding which would prevent the effective disposition of the
cause before the federal court.93 In the past, federal courts have restrained
garnishment proceedings in state courts which would interfere with the
90. Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros. Co., 348 U.S. 511, 516-18
(1955) ; but see Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1964).
In addition, the fact that effectuation of the Congressional purpose may be hampered
by lack of enforcement in state courts is insufficient to imply injunctive power to enjoin
state court proceedings. See Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1964).
91. Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 306. For the text of this section see note 74 supra.
92. Supra note 76 and accompanying text. The Secretary's power to obtain
injunctive relief is limited to situations involving violations of section 215 of the FLSA,
the prohibitions of which are directed against "any person." For the purposes of the
FLSA, "person" is defined as "an individual, partnership, association, corporation,
business trust, legal representative, or any organized group of persons." (29 U.S.C. §
203(a) (1964)). The prohibited actions of section 215 (e.g., the shipment of goods in
commerce, violation of minimum wage and maximum hours, discrimination against
employees) are not judicial in nature and it seems clear that Congress did not intend
the injunctive power granted under the FLSA to include injunctions against state court
proceedings.
93. Reviser's Note, H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A181-82 (1947). See
Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros. Co., 348 U.S. 511, 514 (1955);
Jacksonville Blow Pipe Co. v. RFC, 244 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1957) (alternative holding).
Also see Comment, Federal Injunctions Against State Actions, 35 GFo. WAsr. L. REv.
744, 786-87 (1967) ; Comment, Federal Power to Enjoin State Court Proceedings,
74 HARV. L. REV. 726, 734-37 (1961).
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payment by an employer of back wages under an order by the NLRB.9"
These injunctions are, however, clearly in aid of the court's jurisdiction.95
In contrast, when the only cause of action before the federal court would
be a request for an injunction against state court garnishment pro-
ceedings in violation of Title III, it is clear that issuance of the injunction
would not be in aid of the federal court's prior jurisdiction.
It has been suggested that the aid-of-jurisdiction exception could
be interpreted to include the exclusive jurisdiction vested in a federal
agency." However, Title III does not vest any jurisdiction over wage
garnishment actions in the Secretary of Labor; rather, Title III merely
charges him with enforcement."7 In rare instances a federal court might,
however, acquire jurisdiction by removal of a garnishment proceeding
from the state court. The federal court could then protect its prior
jurisdiction in conformance with the provisions of section 2283."s
Protection or Effectuation of Judgment Exception
The last express exception to section 2283 permits a federal court
to enjoin state court proceedings if necessary "to protect or effectuate
its judgments." Obviously, if there is no antecedent judgment in the
federal court, this exception would not apply. A possible method for
obtaining prior judgment in the federal court is suggested by a recent
Supreme Court decision where the question of the appropriateness of
granting declaratory relief was held to be independent of the propriety
94. E.g,, NLRB v. Schertzer, 360 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1966) ; NLRB v. Ozanne Inc.,
307 F.2d 81 (1st Cir. 1962) ; NLRB v. Sunshine Mining Co., 125 F.2d 757 (9th Cir.
1942) ; cf. NLRB v. Stackpole Carbon Co., 128 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1942).
95. The Board shall have power to petition any court of appeals of the
United States . . . for the enforcement of such order [preventing unfair
labor practices] and for appropriate temporary relief or restraining order....
Upon the filing of such petition, the court . . .shall have jurisdiction of the
proceeding and of the question determined therein, and shall have power to
grant such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just and proper....
29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1964).
96. Comment, Federal Power to Enjoin State Court Proceedings, 74 HAv. L.
REv. 726, 737-40 (1961).
97. Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 306. For the text of this statute see note 74 supra.
98. "Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original
jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court
of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action
is pending... ' 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1964). Garnishment proceedings have been held
to be "civil actions" within the meaning of section 1441 (a) ; e.g., Adriaenssens v. All-
state Ins. Co., 258 F.2d 888 (10th Cir. 1958) ; Stoll v. Hawkeye Cas. Co., 185 F.2d 96
(8th Cir. 1950). However, since the original jurisdiction of the district courts is limited
by a 10,000 dollar minimum jurisdictional amount in both federal question jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (a) (1964) and diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)
(1964), the vast majority of state garnishment proceedings would not be removable by
the garnishee-employer to a federal court.
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of injunctive relief as determined by the doctrine of equitable abstention.9
Thus a federal court which had issued a declaratory judgment establishing
the applicability of the federal garnishment limitation contained in Title
III could subsequently protect this judgment by enjoining state court
proceedings.
Judicial Exception to Section 2283
In 1957, the Supreme Court, in Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United
States,' indicated that the restrictions of section 2283 were not appli-
cable to injunctions sought by the United States. However, the character
of the federal interest in Leiter fell within a traditional exception to the
anti-injunction statutes; i.e., cases in which the United States is defending
a property right it possesses.' Under these circumstances, the suit in
the state court could not have been dispositive of the issue since the
United States was not a party. The Court also stressed the fact that the
position of the United States was a defensive one and "superior federal
interests" were threatened with irreparable harm."2
This language in Leiter has subsequently been broadly interpreted
by lower federal courts to include the federal interest in Indian lands0 3
and the private constitutional rights of oppressed minorities0 . within the
concept "superior federal interests." The extent to which these ad hoc
judicial exemptions based upon a broad reading of Leiter will be extended
in the future is impossible to predict. In perhaps the broadest reading
to date, a Fifth Circuit decision held that no distinction should be made
on either the type of state court proceeding or the nature of the federal
interests so long as the United States asserted the interest.0 5 This reading
of Leiter might permit the Secretary of Labor to obtain injunctive relief
99. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967). For a discussion of the jurisdictional
amount limitation see note 83 supra.
100. Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220 (1957).
101. E.g., United States v. McIntosh, 57 F.2d 573 (E.D. Va. 1932) ; United States
v. Babcock, 6 F.2d 160 (D. Ind. 1925), todified, 9 F.2d 905 (7th Cir. 1925); United
States v. Inaba, 291 F. 416 (E.D. Wash. 1923) ; contra, United States v. Parkhurst-
Davis Mercantile Co., 176 U.S. 317 (1900) ; United States v. Land Title Bank & Trust
Co., 90 F.2d 970 (3d Cir. 1937).
102. 352 U.S. at 226.
103. E.g., Alonzo v. United States, 249 F.2d 189 (1957) ; see Minnesota v. United
States, 305 U.S. 382 (1939).
104. E.g., United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1967); Dilworth v.
Riner, 343 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1965); United States v. Wood, 295 F.2d 772 (5th Cir.
1961). See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
105. United States v. Wood, 295 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1961) ; accord, Baines v. City
of Danville, 337 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1964) (both actions arising under the Civil Rights
Act of 1957). But cf. Eden Memorial Park Ass'n v. United States, 300 F.2d 432 (9th
Cir. 1962).
The requirement that the United States assert the interest precludes an employee
from seeking injunctive relief. Even if this barrier could be overcome the employee would
then be confronted with the jurisdictional problems discussed supra note 66.
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to enforce Title III since suits by the Secretary under the FLSA are,
in effect, suits by the United States... and the interest to be protected is
a federal one.
However, considering the factual distinctions between the action in
Leiter and an action under Title III, extension of the Leiter doctrine
seems inappropriate. There is no vested property interest in the United
States under Title III in the sense of the traditionally exempt cases, nor
could the action of the United States be considered defensive as it was
in Leiter. Although Title III may be a recognition by Congress of a
"superior federal interest" in limited garnishments, the issuance of a
federal injunction to stay state garnishment proceedings, traditionally
considered local in nature, hardly seems to harmonize with the over-
riding doctrine of equitable abstention.
The fact remains, however, that the Leiter exception was clearly
not based on the express provisions of section 2283, but was based on
rules of statutory construction applied in the absence of legislative history
speaking to the point. As such, it represents a certain willingness on the
part of the Court to treat section 2283, not as defining strict jurisdictional
boundaries of the federal courts, but as representing a statutory expres-
sion of the comity principle. Thus, if the federal interest in limited
garnishments is thought to outweigh the benefits to be gained from
equitable abstention based on comity, section 2283 would not bar injunc-
tive relief requested by the Secretary of Labor in enforcing Title III.
III. EFFECT OF TITLE III ON STATE EXEMPTION STATUTES
Title III allows the Secretary of Labor to exempt from the operation
of the garnishment exemption provision of Title III any garnishments
issued under state laws which provide for "substantially similar" exemp-
tions.' Title III provides no express limitations on the application of
106. Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 260 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1958);
Walling v. Frank Adam Elec. Co., 163 F.2d 277 (8th Cir. 1947) ; Walling v. Norfolk
S. Ry., 162 F.2d 95 (4th Cir. 1947).
107. "The Secretary of Labor may by regulation exempt from the provisions of
section 303 (a) garnishments issued under the laws of any State if he determines that
the laws of that State provide restrictions on garnishment which are substantially similar
to those provided in section 303(a)." Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 305. Section 307 provides
that Title III ".... does not annul, alter, or affect, or exempt any person from complying
with, the laws of any State (1) prohibiting garnishment or for providing for more
limited garnishments than are allowed under this title. . . ." In order to give each of
these sections effect, section 307 must be read as qualifying the "substantially similar"
criterion of section 305. To do otherwise would result either in the two sections con-
tradicting one another or in defeating the purpose of Title III. When read in the light
of section 307, section 305 would provide the Secretary of Labor with discretion to
exempt any state with an equal or greater garnishment exemption which is otherwise
"substantially similar."
The authority delegated to the Secretary under section 305 would seem to be within
the limitations defined by the Supreme Court in the past. So long as the delegated
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the "substantially similar" test by the Secretary, but the purpose of
creating uniformity in state garnishment laws implies several limitations
on the authority delegated to the Secretary. The exemption provided in
Title II11.8 does not distinguish between the debtor-employees to whom
the exemption applies on the basis of personal characteristics or status.
Its application is applied uniformly to all "individuals" and there is no
group of debtor-employees left without its coverage. Nor is there any
distinction based on the source of the debt or on the nature of the creditor
seeking the garnishment. The only exceptions provided are for judicial
orders for support, contributions to wage earner plans, and state and
federal tax liabilities.109
Thus, for a state statute's provisions to be "substantially similar"
to the exemption provided in Title III, it must be applied uniformly to
all debtor-employees, and provide an exemption of the magnitude of
Title III or greater. Any state exemption statute which would allow
any debtor-employee a smaller exemption, or which differentiates between
debtor-employees on the basis of some personal characteristics, such as
resident of state, head of household, family provider, or which varies the
amount of the exemption on the basis of the nature of the loan or the
debtor, such as necessaries or collection agencies, must of necessity fail
to be "substantially similar."
Applying this analysis to the existent state statutes, their differences,
and therefore their deficiencies, become readily apparent.11 Eleven states
exclude a substantial percentage of their citizens from any exemption at
authority is limited to applying and executing a law established by Congress, the delega-
tion is constitutional. Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944); Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). The limitation on delegation serves (1)
to insure that policy decisions are made by a body directly responsible to the electorate
and (2) to provide the judiciary with adequate standards by which to judge any
delegated action subsequently taken. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963). The
Secretary is not delegated any policy-making power under Title III, but is only
permitted to use his own discretion in comparing state exemption statutes with section
305. The very limited exercise of discretion allowed the Secretary would seem to permit
the Supreme Court to ascertain whether the Secretary carries out Congress' intent by
his subsequent actions, and therefore the delegation would be constitutionally valid.
See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
108. Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 303 (a). For the text of this statute see note 9 supra.
109. Id., § 303(b). For the text of this statute see note 9 supra.
110. An argument could be made based on section 301(a), see notes 20 and 30 spra
(purpose of Title III) and section 307(1), see note 128 infra (effect on state laws),
that only the non-conforming portion of a state statute should be superceded. However,
section 305, see note 107 supra, provides that garnishments shall be exempted from the
operation of Title III if the garnishment exemption laws of the state provide substanti-
ally similar restrictions. This statement would seem to indicate a determination
broader in scope than a provision by provision assessment of state wage garnishment
exemption laws: if the state laws provide substantially similar restrictions, then
garnishments issued under them are exempted from the provision of section 303; if they
do not, then any garnishment issued would be subject to the Title III limitations.
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all,"1' and twelve other states limit their exemptions to residents or those
debtor-employees whose families reside within the state.112 Of the remain-
ing states, eight discriminate on the basis of such factors as dependency,
marital status, head of household or family head," 8 four on the basis of
various other characteristics of the debtor-employee," 4 and four on the
basis of the nature of the debt." 5 Thus the exemption statutes of only the
eleven remaining states and the District of Columbia" 6 comply with the
uniformity required by Title III.
Applying the second test, according to which every debtor-employee
whose wages are capable of being garnisheed within a state must be
given an exemption at least equal to that contained in Title IIT,"1 the
eleven states which exclude a large portion of their citizens from any
exemption"' as well as the twelve other states which qualify their exemp-
111. AxRiz. REV. STAT. ANT. §§12-1594, 33-1126 (1956); FLA. STAT. § 222.11
(1963) ; IOWA CODE § 627.10 (Supp. 1968) ; Mo. REv. STAT. § 525.030 (1949); MONT.
REv. CODES ANN. § 93-5816 (1964); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1558 (1964); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 26-2-27, 24-6-7 (Supp. 1967); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-362 (1953); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 10-1731 (1962); S.D. CODE § 33.2404 (Supp. 1960) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-
23-1(7) (1953), UTAH REv. Civ. PRoc. R. 64c(a).
112. ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 630 (1958) ; ARK. CONST. art. 9, § 1-2, ARK. STAT. ANN.§ 30.207 (Supp. 1967) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 11-205(7) (1947); IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-
3501 (Burns 1968 Repl.) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2310 (1964) ; Miss. CODE ANN. §
307(Tenth) (Supp. 1966); NEv. REv. STAT. § 21.090(h) (1968); N.D. CENT. CODE §
39-09-02 (Supp. 1967); Oaio REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2329.66(F), 2329.62(C) (Page
Supp. 1967); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 1 (Supp. 1967); TENN. CODE ANN. §§
26-207, 208 (Supp. 1968) ; Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-422 (1957).
113. ALASKA STAT. § 09.35.080 (Supp. 1967); CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 77-2-4
(1963); ILL. ANN. STAT. § 62-73 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967); MICH. ComP. LAws §
600.7511 (1968); MiN . STAT. ANN. §§ 550.37(13), 575.05 (Supp. 1967); VA. CODE
ANN. § 34-29 (Supp. 1968); WASH. rEv. CODE § 7.32.280 (Supp. 1967); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 267.18 (Supp. 1968).
114. CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 690.10 (West 1955) (seamen, seagoing fishermen,
and sealers); DEn. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4913(b), (c) (1953) (variation between
counties); MD. ANN. CODE art. 9, §§ 31, 31A, 31B (Supp. 1965) (variation between
counties); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 9-26-4.12(c) (Supp. 1967) (seamen, wife and
minor child, and those on relief or recently on relief).
115. Ky. REv. STAT. § 427.010 (Supp. 1966) (necessities); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 512:21 (Supp. 1967) (small loan contract); ORE. REv. STAT. § 23.181 (1967)
(judgment for damages for fraud); PA. STAT. tit. 42, § 886 (1966) (judgment for
board or lodging).
116. CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 52-361 (Supp. 1968); D.C. CODE ANN. §16-572
(Supp. IV 1965); GA. CODE ANN. § 46-208 (Supp. 1965); HAWAii REv. LAws §
237-1 (Supp. 1963) ; LA. REv. STAT. tit. 13, § 3881 (1964); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14,
c. 501, § 2602(6) (Supp. 1967); MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 246, § 28 (Supp. 1967); N.J.
REv. STAT. §§ 2A:17-56 (1951); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. §§ 5205(e), 5231(e) (McKinney
Supp. 1968); TEx. CONST. art. 16, § 28, and TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3832, 4099
(1966) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 3020 (Supp. 1968) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38-5A-
3, 38-8-1 (1966). For the purposes of this analysis, minor exceptions affecting only very
limited groups were ignored.
117. See the discussion in note 50 supra.
118. Arizona, Florida, Iowa, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North
Carolina, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Utah. See note 111 sutpra for full citations
to the relevant statutes.
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tions with a residency requirement119 are, of necessity, disqualified.
Statutes in twenty-one of the remaining twenty-eight jurisdictions must
also fail since debtor-employees in some pay ranges receive a smaller
exemption under state laws than under Title III.12 As to the remaining
119. Alabama, Arkansas, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Mississippi, Nevada, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Wyoming. See note 112 supra for full
citations to the relevant statutes.
120. In the chart below, example wage levels are given at which the states shown
permit garnishments in excess of the limitation in Title III. Frequently, other wage
levels would meet the federal criterion. For purposes of this survey, statutory exceptions
applying to only very limited groups and differences in state laws concerning deductions
withheld prior to garnishment are ignored. Also, since some state statutes are stated
in terms of daily or monthly earnings, it is necessary to anticipate the Secretary's
adjustments. For this purpose, the rather crude conversion formulae 4.286 weeks
1 month (30 - 7 = 4.286) and 1 week = 5 working days have been used.
Amount Subject to Garnishment
Disposable Pay Federal State Statute
State Earnings Period §303 Amt. Status of Debtor or Debt
$400.00 $100.00 $200.00 Single
Alaska 600.00 30 days 150.00 250.00 Married
California 400.00 30 days 100.00 200.00 Single
Colorado 400.00 30 days 100.00 120.00 Head of Family
400.00 100.00 260.00 Single
Connecticut 100.00 Weekly 25.00 35.00
Delaware 100.00 Weekly 25.00 40.00 Resident of Kent or Sussex County
100.00 25.00 100.00 Resident of New Castle County &
debt not for necessaries
District of 800.00 Calen- 200.00 230.00
Columbia dar
Month
Georgia 20.00 Daily 5.00 8.50
Illinois 40000 Weekly 48.00 60.00
Kentucky 100.00 Weekly 25.00 50.00 Debt not for necessities
Maine 100.00 Weekly 25.00 60.00
Maryland 160.00 Weekly 40.00 60.00 Not a resident of Cecil, Caroline, Kent,
_ _ _ _ Queen Anne's, or Worcester County
Massachusetts 100.00 Weekly 25.00 50.00
Michigan 100.00 Weekly 25.00 40.00 First garnishment and head of household
with family
Minnesota 100.00 Weekly 25.00 50.00 Not necessary for family support
New Hampshire 100.00 Weekly 25.00 50.00 Debt based upon small loan contract
Oregon 400 00 30 days 100.00 200.00
Rhode Island 100.00 Weekly 25.00 50.00 Not a member of exempted classes listed in
_ _ __i00 _ ____statute
Vermont 100.00 'Weekly 25.00 50.00
Virginia 40000 Monthly 100.00 250.00 House-holder
40000 100.00 325.00 Nonhouse-holder
Washington 100.00 Weekly 25.00 55.00 Debtor with two dependents
100.00 25.00 75.00 Debtor without dependents
Wisconsin 400.00 30 days 100.00 375.00 Debtor without dependents before judgment
400.00 100.00 300.00 Debtor without dependents after judgment
It should be noted that frequently state exemption statutes are drafted in terms of
fixed amounts rather than percentage figures and consequently garnishments at high
wage levels may be inconsistent with those under Title III. However, the differences
shown above all occurred at a weekly wage level of 100 dollars, or its equivalent in
daily or monthly pay periods, with the exception of the District of Columbia, Illinois,
and Maryland. The wage level necessary to produce a divergence from Title III was
particularly unrealistic in the example used for Illinois.
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seven jurisdictions, Pennsylvania, in addition to providing exceptions
similar to those in Title III, suspends the total exemption in the case of
a judgment for board or lodging' 2' which would seem to fault the
statute. In both New York 12 and New Jersey' 2. the exemption percentage
is greater than that of Title III but the court is granted discretion to
reduce the exemption. Assuming these state courts do not permit garnish-
ments exceeding the minimum exemption of Title III, these statutes
would not be superseded. The remaining statutes, those of Hawaii,
24
Louisiana, 22 Texas,126 and West Virginia,1 2 7 all provide larger exemp-
tions than that contained in Title III and therefore would not be
superseded.'
CONCLUSION
The restriction on wage garnishment provided by Title III is a
significant expansion of federal regulation into an area traditionally
considered local in nature. As such, it exemplifies an increasing realiza-
tion that, in a society whose economy is heavily based upon consumer
credit, federal regulation is necessary to effectively control abuses and to
insure the economic well-being of the nation's commerce. However, Title
III's limitation on the availability to creditors of the only reachable asset
which many wage earners possess may well have unanticipated and
undesirable adverse effects upon credit extension especially in such retail
areas as the automobile industry where credit is a commercial necessity.
The penal sanction of Title III prohibiting discharges by reason of
garnishment for a single indebtedness will likely have only a limited
direct deterrent effect upon employers, since in many instances labor
union contracts or bargaining agreements coupled with arbitration pro-
ceedings already regulate such discharges. However, to the extent that
this statutory duty serves as a basis for an implied private civil remedy,
Title III provides a discharged debtor-employee with effective protection
against further aggravation of a personal economic crisis.
121. PA. STAT. tit. 42, § 886 (1966).
122. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. §§ 5205(e), 5231(e) (McKinney Supp. 1968).
123. N.J. Rav. STAT. §§ 2A:17-56 (1951).
124. HAwAII REv. LAWS § 237-1 (Supp. 1963).
125. LA. REV. STAT. tit. 13, § 3881 (1964).
126. TEX. CoNsT. art. 16, § 28, and TEx. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3832, 4099
(1966).
127. W. VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 38-5A-3, 38-8-1 (1966).
128. This title does not annul, alter, or affect, or exempt any person from
complying with, the laws of any State (1) prohibiting garnishments or pro-
viding for more limited garnishments than are allowed under this title, or (2)
prohibiting the discharge of any employee by reason of the fact that his
earnings have been subjected to garnishment for more than one indebtedness.
Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 307.
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Undoubtedly the most far-reaching effect of Title II1 will be the
establishment of a nationally uniform garnishment exemption limitation
which applies to all debtor-employees alike. By eliminating exceptions to
exemption coverage, and by establishing a federal minimum standard for
state exemptions, many of the present economic evils of wage garnish-
ment will be abolished. However, Title III does not regulate assignments
of future wages, and the extent to which creditors are permitted by state
law to require execution of such wage assignments as a prerequisite to
extending credit will probably determine the ultimate effectiveness of the
protection offered to consumers by Title 111.129
David L. Cocanower
129. It should also be noted that the harsh effects of excessive garnishments will
not be eliminated in those cases which are excepted from Title III's restriction on
garnishments; i.e., court orders for support, orders of a court of bankruptcy under a
wage earner plan, or debts due for state and federal taxes. For example, the protection
offered by Title III must seem hollow indeed to the wife and son of an auto worker
who recently
. . . discovered his entire week's take-home pay of $112.39 had been turned
over to the state of Indiana for delinquent state income taxes. Beset by debts,
he asked officials at Ford Motor Co.'s plant in suburban Chicago Heights, Ill.,
for his accrued vacation pay to tide him over.
Next payday, he learned Indiana-the state where he used to live-had
received $208.84 out of his $363.93 in wages and vacation pay. The 24-
year-old father of a young boy, not knowing how much he owed Indiana tax
collectors, (the two deductions actually satisfied the claim) became despondent
over the pay loss. Two days later, [he] placed a .22 calibre rifle under his
chin and shot a bullet into his brain.
Hearings on H.R. 11601 Before the Subcomni. on Consumer Affairs of the House Commn.
on Banking and Ciorrency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 765 (1967) (article by James
P. Gannon, Staff Reporter of The Wall Street Journal).
